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1. INTRODUCTION 
The received literature on social preferences (in particular the branches that relate to status 
and income dispersion) and on endogenous work effort typically characterizes agents as 
homogeneous in their preferences (see, for example, Fang and Moscarini, 2005; Dur and 
Glazer, 2008; Stark and Hyll, 2011). A few researchers allow for heterogeneity of 
preferences, though in a partial sense as, for instance, do Bandiera et al. (2010) who assume 
that workers are heterogeneous in terms of the cost of their work effort, but not in terms of the 
benefit (utility) that they derive from their pay. In this paper we assume complete 
heterogeneity of preferences. We construct a model in which members of a small population, 
in this case a village, differ in the weights that they assign to the components of their utility 
functions, which include utility from consumption, disutility from exerting work effort, and 
disutility from having low relative income (income that is lower than the incomes of others 
with whom they compare themselves).   
We apply the model to a particularly fitting setting: departures from a population. We 
refer to this as migration, and to the population as a village. A village is not only a spatially 
concentrated economy in commodity (inputs and outputs) space; it also constitutes a compact 
social space.1 Compactness is conducive to preferences based on social comparisons, and 
these comparisons are more intense than they would be had the social space been loose. In a 
village, individuals do not need to expend effort to collect data on the incomes of others in 
order to calculate their relative income because incomes are largely known, and proxies such 
as size of house, size of plot, or size of herd are visible at no cost, and are easily available to 
everyone. A village setting enables us to make a direct contribution to the migration literature. 
                                                          
1 The social compactness is affected by size. For example, in 2011 in India alone there were 236,000 villages 
with a population of fewer than 500 people (Government of India, 2011). 
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After all, migration changes the social environment in which people live: almost by definition, 
not only does migration change the social space of those who leave, it also modifies the social 
space of those who stay; a migration from a village changes the social space of the non-
migrants. Because people routinely engage in comparisons with others, and are affected by 
these comparisons (especially when the comparisons are about levels of income, 
consumption, or wealth), revisions of their social comparison space brought about by 
migration impinge on their wellbeing and, consequently, on their behavior.2 When some 
migrate from the village, those who stay in the village adjust their behavior to the consequent 
changes in their social space. Even though, in principle, a migrant might remain in the social 
comparison space of the non-migrants, in the current setting where each villager is taken to be 
a producer, our model applies because we assume that upon migration, the migrant’s village 
production ceases.    
Migration from agriculture to other activities has been viewed as an important source 
of productivity gains in developing countries. When workers relocate from rural areas, where 
the value of their marginal product is low, to urban areas, aggregate output increases. This 
effect and the underlying reasons for it have already been studied meticulously by Kuznets 
(1971), and require no detailed elaboration here. Suffice it to note that the “location” of the 
surge in productivity is urban, that it comes about even when workers are not matched with 
more production inputs (exposure to agglomeration economies is one source), let alone when 
they are matched with more and superior production inputs. There has been much less 
discussion however of the effect of departures from a village on the productivity of those 
remaining there.  
                                                          
2 Empirical studies that marshal evidence regarding the role of interpersonal comparisons for people’s behavior 
include Zizzo and Oswald (2001), Luttmer (2005), Fliessbach et al. (2007), Blanchflower and Oswald (2008), 
Takahashi et al. (2009), Card et al. (2012), and Cohn et al. (2014). 
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The standard approach to tackling the effect of migration from a village on the output 
of those who remain in the village is to trace the impact of migrants’ remittances. Directly or 
indirectly, remittances can support the acquisition of productive or productivity-enhancing 
devices, implements, and protocols (Stark, 2009, and references provided therein). The 
received literature is reticent about the possibility that, without remittances, in the wake of 
migration the very revisions of the income distribution and of the social comparison space in 
the village will set in motion behavioral responses of the non-migrants, including changes in 
their work effort and, as a consequence, their output. In comparison with the considerable 
attention that is given to the role of remittances, the question of how, in and by itself, 
migration affects the behavior of the people who stay behind remains under-researched. We 
inquire how changes in social space brought about by migration impact on the non-migrants’ 
optimal choice of how much work effort to exert. Inter alia, we specify conditions under 
which, in the wake of migration from a village by the least hard-working individual, the non-
migrants will increase their work effort which, in turn, will yield an increase in the village’s 
per capita output. This increase is distinct from the static arithmetic increase of the village per 
capita output brought about when a producer whose output is below the average output is 
omitted from the averaging. The increase arises even though output is not generated through 
joint production.  
In one respect, however, the approach taken in this paper follows an earlier track, 
namely that migration from a village affects the risk-taking behavior of non-migrants: a 
diversified “demographic portfolio” allows households that have migrant members to 
undertake riskier projects (Taylor, 1986; Stark, 1993; Taylor and Adelman, 1996). And the 
riskier projects, which are characterized by higher average returns, increase the output of the 
non-migrants. Increased risk-taking by households with migrant members is not necessarily 
brought about in response to the receipt of remittances but, rather, as a response to the 
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possibility of drawing on remittances in the event of failure of a risky project, like a sort of an 
insurance policy. That being said, as shown below, our model identifies a new channel via 
which migration affects the risk-taking behavior of the non-migrants. 
It is worth adding that at the heart of earlier research on migration, in particular Stark 
and Bloom (1985), Lucas and Stark (1985), Rosenzweig and Stark (1989), and Stark (1993), 
lies the perception that the migration of a family member influences the constraints, 
endowments, and opportunities of the family members who stay behind. These texts, as well 
as many works that have developed the concepts and approach presented in the earlier 
research, focused on identifying and measuring the ways in which migration led to revision of 
the constraints, endowments, and opportunities. For example, the receipt of remittances was 
shown to relieve credit pressures and make it easier to adopt better farming technologies. 
However, that entire body of work failed to study the endogenous revision of effort 
independent of the increase in resources and the relaxation of credit and other constraints. 
Moreover, even if the said relaxation applied, an increase in work effort would naturally 
complement it: a shift to a technology that yields more valuable crops will invite putting in 
more effort on account that effort exertion becomes more rewarding. The approach taken in 
the current paper is novel in that the change of effort is brought about without changing the 
constraints, endowments, and opportunities, and in that the change is specific with regard to 
the position of the migrant in the income distribution at origin. 
In the remainder of this paper we proceed as follows. In Section 2 we study the 
decisions of individuals with heterogeneous preferences as to how much work effort to exert. 
In Section 3 we apply the model to the setting of migration. We ask how negatively selective 
departures from a village affect the work effort of the non-migrants. In Section 4 we conclude. 
 
 
5 
  
2. A MODEL OF ENDOGENOUS WORK EFFORT IN AN ECONOMY WITH 
HETEROGENEOUS AGENTS 
Let the utility function of individual i from population P that consists of n individuals take the 
form 
             ( , , ) ( )i i i i i i i i i iU c e RD f c g e RD     ,                      (1) 
where ci denotes the consumption of individual i; ei is the work effort of individual i; and RDi 
is the relative deprivation (defined in (2) below) of individual i. We assume that 
( ) 0, ( ) 0f f      , that ( ) 0, ( ) 0g g     , that 
( )
lim 0
i
i i
e
i
U e
e



, and that 
0
( )
lim 0
i
i i
e
i
U e
e



.3 
The three parameters 0i  , 0i  , and 0i   assign weights to the individual’s utility from 
consumption, to the individual’s disutility from work effort, and to the individual’s disutility 
from relative deprivation, respectively.  
As stated, ,  ,  and i i i    are taken as (exogenous) parameters. The underlying idea 
behind the fixing of ,  ,  and i i i    is that, as tastes, they are taken to be stable, having been 
formed over a long period of time, and are the product of cultural norms and social 
conventions and, as such, are assumed not to change as a result of a marginal change in the 
composition of the population under study. 
In order to represent the heterogeneity of the preferences of the individuals in P, the 
preference parameters are indexed by i. Consumption is constrained by the individual’s 
income, yi; that is, i ic y . Returns from work are the only source of income. The work effort 
exerted by an individual converts into income on a one-to-one basis; that is, .i ie y  
                                                          
3 We assume that in terms of the effect on the individual’s utility, the exertion of an additional unit of effort is 
worse when the level of effort is high than the exertion of an additional unit of effort when the level of effort is 
low, hence, ( ) 0g   . 
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Naturally, effort is not the only source of income and consumption; assets and savings 
contribute too. Ignoring inheritances, luck, and the like, assets and savings are determined by 
effort so, essentially, we are working our way backwards, developing a reduced-form model.  
We assume that the preferences of the individuals satisfy conditions that ensure the existence 
of an equilibrium in which the endogenously determined levels of work effort of the 
individuals in P can be ranked unambiguously: 
1 2 ... ne e e   . This assumption enables us to 
refer to the individuals’ rank in the distribution of effort as given. For example, the 
assumption fits well when there is a long-run equilibrium in which the individuals’ effort and 
income are set and are publicly known, as noted in the Introduction. In this context, while 
when their social space changes (due to migration of an individual), individuals revise their 
effort, the adjustment takes place without a concurrent or a subsequent change in the initial 
hierarchy of the levels of effort. The work effort distribution maps onto the distribution of 
incomes in P, namely onto 
1 2 ... ny y y   . From now on, we name the individuals according 
to their rank in the distribution of effort / income. 
We define the relative deprivation of individual i as  
           1
           for  {1,..., 1}, 
 
                                f
1
or  .
( )
0
n
j i
j ii
y i n
D
i
n
n
y
R  


 
 


                  (2) 
Thus, relative deprivation is the aggregate of the income excesses divided by the size of the 
population. The measure of relative deprivation defined in (2) is cardinal: it is sensitive to 
changes in the income levels of individuals higher up in the income hierarchy even if the 
changes do not translate into revisions of ordinal rank. For example, in income distribution 
(10, 20), the ordinal measure of relative deprivation of the individual whose income is 10, 
namely the rank (position) , 1,...,1n n  of the individual as measured by the difference 
between the top rank and his position in the income hierarchy, is the same (second) as in 
7 
  
income distribution (10, 11), whereas the cardinal measure is not the same (applying (2), 
relative deprivation is 5 in income distribution (10, 20), and it is 0.5 in income distribution 
(10, 11)).4 A rationale for, background to, and applications of the measure defined in (2) are 
provided in the appendix. As already stated, incomes are known to the members of the small 
population.  
 The measure defined in (2) can be multiplied and divided by ,  n i n i  . This results 
in a slight rewrite of the definition of relative deprivation given in (2):  
               
 
1
          for  1,..., 1 , 
 
                                             fo
1
0 r  .
n
j i
j ii
i n
n i
y y
RD n n i
i n
 
 
 
   
 




                    (3) 
The representation in (3) is interpreted as follows: the term   /n i n  in (3) is the fraction of 
the individuals in P whose income is higher than the income of individual i, and the bracketed 
term in (3) is the difference between the average income of the individuals higher up in the 
income hierarchy, and the income of individual i. Below, use of (3) will ease the derivations 
and aid interpretation, so we will use it rather than use (2). 
Noting that the constraint on consumption 
i ic y  must be binding, inserting (3) into 
(1), and recalling the assumption that work effort converts into income on a one-to-one basis, 
the utility function of individual i can be represented by  
                                                          
4 A model of migration based on an ordinal measure of relative deprivation is in Stark (2017). It is worth noting 
that the results reported in the current paper depend on the cardinality of the measure of relative deprivation. 
This can be seen straightforwardly if, instead, relative deprivation were to be measured by rank, where rank 
deprivation is defined as the distance in terms of positions below the top rank n. In such a case, if the individuals 
are ranked as , 1,...,1n n , the departure of individual 1 will not affect the rank of any other individual, with the 
effort adjustments reported in the text not needed. However, even if rank is the yardstick, and if rank is measured 
as distance in terms of positions from the bottom - and analytically speaking this is feasible if intuitively not 
appealing - then results of the type reported in the paper will hold qualitatively, and even be strengthened 
because all the individuals will experience increased relative deprivation, individual n included. In addition, if in 
calculating their relative deprivation individuals assign significant weight to the individual at the top of the 
distribution and quantify their relative deprivation by the distance from that individual divided by the size of the 
population, then the departure of individual 1 will have an effect similar to the one reported in the text.  
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 
 
1
         for  {1,..., 1},
                                                    for  .
1
( )
( )
( )
n
i i i i i j i
j ii i
i i i i
n i
f e g e e e
n n iU e
f e g
i n
i ne
  
 
 
 
   

 
   



      (4) 
Then, 
             
 
 
       ( )( )   for  {1,..., 1},
                        for  ,( )
i i i i ii i
i
i i i i
i
n i
f e g eU e
n
e
f e ng
n
e i
  
 
 

   



   
                 (5) 
and  
               
2
2
         for  {1,...,
)
( ) }
(i i
i i i i
i
U e
f e g i ne
e
 

   

.                   (6) 
Because 0i  , 0i  , ( ) 0f    , and ( ) 0g   , it follows that the right-hand side of (6) is 
negative, which implies that the utility function in (4) is concave in ei. The 
conditions
( )
lim 0
i
i i
e
i
U e
e



 and 
0
( )
lim 0
i
i i
e
i
U e
e



 presented just after introducing (1) can 
alternatively be expressed, respectively, as 
                                             
  lim
lim i
i
i i i
e
i
e
i
n i
g e
nf e
 




 
                                          (7) 
and  
                                                
  
0
0
lim
lim i
i
i i i
e
i
e
i
n i
g e
nf e
 




 
  .                                       (8) 
The properties of the utility function in (5) and (6) in conjunction with conditions (7) and (8) 
imply that there exists a unique solution for the optimal level of work effort, *ie ,  1,...,i n , 
and that this solution is interior, * 0ie  .  
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The optimal work effort of individual i is given implicitly by the first-order conditions 
obtained from (5):  
                
 
 
         for  {1,..., 1},(
                        
*) * 0
( *) f* 0 or  ,
i i i i i
i i i i
n i
f e i n
i
g e
n
f e g e n
  
 


    
   
                 (9) 
implying that  
              
 
         for  {1,..., 1},
                      for 
* *
 .
, ,
* * ,
i i i i i
i i i i
i n
n i
e e
n
e i ne
  
 
 
 
 




               (10) 
As seen in (10), the optimal level of work effort of a member  1,..., 1i n   of the population 
is a function of the weight accorded to satisfaction about his own income; the weight accorded 
to dissatisfaction about work effort; and the weight accorded to dissatisfaction from relative 
deprivation, which is weighted by the fraction of the individuals higher up in the effort / 
income hierarchy. The work effort exerted by an individual in P determines the individual’s 
output. 
 
3. APPLICATION OF THE MODEL: MIGRATION 
We now consider the case in which individuals migrate from population P. (For our current 
purposes, the particular reason for migration is not important; we can just assume that 
migration is enabled by the removal of some external barrier, as happens when a road is 
constructed, for example.) Changes in the composition of P modify the social comparison 
space of the individuals who remain in P. Specifically, when individuals depart from P, the 
social space of the remaining members of the population shrinks. The change in the social 
space brings about changes in the optimal levels of work effort exerted by (some) non-
migrating individuals because, as seen in (10), the optimal levels of work effort depend on the 
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fraction of the individuals higher up in the effort / income hierarchy. We assume that the 
changes in work effort leave intact the order of the stayers by effort / income. As the work 
effort exerted by the individuals in P translates into their output, the population’s per capita 
output will be affected.  
Claim 1. Let 2n  . Let the fraction of the individuals who are positioned higher than 
individual i  in the effort / income hierarchy increase. Then *( )ie  , the optimal effort of 
individual  1,..., 1i n  , increases. 
Proof. To assess how changes in the fraction of the individuals higher up in the effort / 
income hierarchy influence the choice of work effort, we calculate the partial derivatives of 
 *ie   in (10) with respect to 
n i
n
 
 
 
, using the implicit function theorem.5 The partial 
derivatives of  *ie   are obtained from   
     
 
 
*
,
*
i
i i
ii
i
Z
e x
Zx
e
 
 
 
 

               (11) 
where, referring to (9) and (10), for  1,..., 1i n  :  
, ,i i i
n i
x
n
 
 
  
 
  and *, , ,i i i i
n i
Z e
n
 
 
 
 
 ( *) * 0i i i i i
n i
f e g e
n
  

     ,  
and for i n :  
 ,i i ix    and    *, , ( *) * 0i i i i i i i iZ e f e g e       . 
                                                          
5 For a large n, 
n i
n

 is approximately a continuous variable. We calculate the derivatives of the optimal effort, 
*
i
e , with respect to 
n i
n

, as an approximation, because our interest is merely to find out the sign of the change, 
rather than to determine the absolute value of the change.  
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Because for  1,..., 1i n    
           
 
 ( *) *
*
i
i i i i
i
Z
f e g e
e
 
 
  

,               (12) 
and  
             
 i
i
Z
n i
n

 

 
  
 
,               (13) 
we obtain that 
                
 
*
0
( *) *
i i
i i i i
e
n i f e g e
n

 

  
   
  
 
,                (14) 
where the inequality sign in (14) follows from the assumptions that 0i  , 0i  , 0i  , 
( ) 0f    , and ( ) 0g   . The meaning of (14) is that changes in the social space which cause 
the fraction of the individuals higher up in the effort / income hierarchy to increase (decrease) 
induce the relatively deprived members of P who stay behind to exert more (less) work 
effort.6 Q.E.D. 
Suppose that a member of P migrates, leaving at the same time the social comparison 
space of the remaining members of the population. And suppose that the migrating individual 
was the least hard-working individual (individual 1). Then for individuals  2,..., 1i n   
remaining in P, the fraction of the individuals whose incomes are higher than theirs increases: 
 1 1
1 1
n i n i n i
n n n
    
 
 
. Therefore, as implied by (14), these individuals increase their 
work effort. Assuming that the increase in the work effort of individuals 2,..., 1n  is such that 
                                                          
6 As noted at the beginning of this section, we assume that adjustments to the work effort made in the wake of a 
departure leave unchanged the ordering by effort / income of the stayers.  
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individual n remains the individual who works hardest, the optimal work effort of individual n 
does not change. Consequently, in the wake of the departure, per capita output increases.  
A lesson drawn from this possibility is that the output of the members of the 
population is affected by the migration of a member even when the production of any member 
is not carried out jointly with the departing individual. Because the per capita output of the 
population may increase on the departure of one of its members, the aggregate post-migration 
output of the population can increase as well. 
The effect of migration on per-capita output in the case under discussion does not arise 
because individuals compare themselves with the least hard-working individual who migrates: 
as exhibited by the measure of relative deprivation, they compare themselves with the 
individuals who are higher up in the income hierarchy. An increase in relative deprivation 
arises from the increase in the fraction of those higher up.  
Remark 1. The result reported in Claim 1 will hold if several of the least hard-
working individuals also migrate, say individuals 1, 2,..., 1,l l , where 1l n  . The effect 
on per capita output of such migration will be even stronger than the effect on per capita 
output of the migration of a single individual because the increase in the fraction of the 
individuals higher up in the income hierarchy will be larger. 
Remark 2. The result reported above is robust to an alternative way of measuring 
relative deprivation. For instance, we can define relative deprivation as the distance from 
below the average effort of the population, namely as  
                                                
          for  :  
                 for 0 , :
i i
i
i
iE e
i
e E
RD
e E
  
 

                                            (15) 
where E  is the average effort in the population. By construction, E  depends on the effort of 
individual i . A departure from the population of any individual whose effort level is lower 
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than E  will result in first-order replacement of E  with a higher value. In this case, the effect 
of migration on relative deprivation will be the same as that based on the measure of relative 
deprivation defined in (2): migration of the least hard-working individual will increase 
relative deprivation and, consequently, will increase per capita output. 
 Remark 3. In the proposed model, departure from the village has consequences not 
only for the optimal effort of those staying behind, but also for their relative risk aversion. To 
see that, consider the standard Arrow-Pratt coefficient of relative risk aversion   
 
( )
( )
( )
i i i
i i
i i
eU e
r e
U e



, 
expressed here in terms of effort. Using equations (5) and (6) for {1,..., 1}i n  , this 
coefficient can be written as  
                                          
  
 
(
( )  
( )
)
i i i i i
i i
i i i i i
e f e g e
r e
n i
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
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.                                        (16) 
The derivative of ( )i ir e  with respect to 
n i
n

 is given by  
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
            
.                              (17) 
As follows from the assumptions about the properties of the functions ( )if e  and  ig e , the 
sign of this derivative is negative. (It is noteworthy that this negative sign will hold if, instead, 
we were to calculate the derivative at the optimal level of effort. The reason is that as follows 
from (14), the optimal effort depends positively on the fraction of the harder-working 
individuals.) It follows then that migration of the least hard-working individual will reduce 
the relative risk aversion of other individuals in the village. In this case, there could be a 
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compounding productivity-raising effect as when, for example, greater willingness to bear 
risks results in the adoption of riskier yet on average higher yields methods of production. 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
We showed how social interactions can lead to production externalities: even when 
individuals’ production is not joint in the technical sense, social preferences render production 
joint in the sense that the presence in the population or the absence from the population of an 
individual affects the output of the other individuals in the population.  
We model how individuals decide how much work effort to exert, taking into account 
heterogeneity of their preferences. We apply the model to departures, asking how departures 
impact on the work effort choices made by individuals whose social space is affected by the 
departures. We find that when individuals care about how, in terms of income, they fare in 
comparison with others, the individuals who stay adjust their work effort to the changes in 
their social space brought about by the departures. Consequently, output is affected. In 
particular, we show that when the least hard-working individual departs from the population, 
the per capita output of the remaining population increases. 
Does the departure of the least hard-working individual not increase the per capita 
output of the remaining population because of the way in which per capita output is defined, 
namely as an average? Our social space modification effect can be differentiated 
quantitatively from the straightforward average effect, even though the two effects result in a 
move in the same direction. Suppose that we have individuals in the population who produce 
1, 2, and 3. When the individual producing 1 leaves, average output goes up from two to two 
and a half. But if we observe that the average output goes up by more, which happens because 
the individual producing 2 experiences increasing relative deprivation (going up from one 
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third to one half) and works harder to reduce the increased disutility from having low relative 
income, then we know that the social space modification effect is operating.  
It is straightforward to see that a similar reasoning applies to the effect of the departure 
of the least hard-working individual on the inequality of the income distribution in the village; 
it is reduced two-fold.  
Although we have studied negatively selective migration, an analogous reasoning 
applies to the case of positively selective migration where it is the hardest working individual 
who departs. As could be expected, in such a case the per capita output in the village will 
decline due to the decrease in the relative deprivation of the non-migrants. The formal 
reasoning is as follows. When the departing individual is individual n, then for every 
individual  1,..., 1i n   remaining in P, the fraction of the individuals whose income is 
higher than his decreases: 
1
1 1
1 1
n i i i n i
n n n n
  
    
 
. Therefore, as implied by (14), 
these individuals decrease their work effort. Consequently, in the wake of the departure, per 
capita output decreases. 
How does the modeling approach pursued in the current paper align with 
considerations of geographical space, social space, and comparison groups, as well as with 
notions of symmetry? In general, we can think of three types of migrating units: individuals, 
families, and individuals as members of families who stay behind. If the migrants who depart 
are of the first two types, then detachment from the village can be conceived as complete: the 
revision of geographical space coincides with the revision of the social space and the 
comparison group. If the migrants are members of families who stay behind and, as already 
noted, this characterization is at the heart of research alluded to in and following “The new 
economics of labor migration” (Stark and Bloom, 1985), then the migrant will not cease 
referring to the village of origin as a comparison group. But this consideration does not 
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disrupt our reasoning. For our purposes what is important is that those who stay behind do not 
continue to refer to the migrant as if he were a fellow villager who stays behind (perhaps, and 
for example, because his income is not easily observed anymore). Nonetheless, will the 
validity of our finding in Claim 1 be compromised if we remove the assumption that the least 
hard-working migrating individual departs from the social comparison space of the remaining 
members of the population? Not necessarily. Suppose that the remaining members continue to 
consider the departing individual as “one of their own,” and suppose that the individual’s 
income increases upon migration, for example to a level higher than that of the remaining 
individuals. It follows that in terms of increased relative deprivation, the remaining 
individuals are “penalized” doubly; therefore, our finding in Claim 1 will merely be 
strengthened. There is a more subtle consideration to bear in mind here, which relates to the 
influence that migration can have on the preferences of the individuals who stay behind, for 
example by demonstrating that working harder is more rewarding than was believed before. 
By the model’s construction, this consequence was not allowed to happen because, and as 
already noted, ,  ,  and i i i    are taken to be fixed. That said, one way of admitting the 
possible influence of migrants’ experience, perceptions, and perspectives on the references of 
those who stay behind, while retaining the integrity of the analysis performed in the paper, 
would be to consider the latter as a short-term response, with a possibly reinforcing impact in 
the longer run.  
Concern about low relative income can vary across societies and over time. When 
social comparisons are intense and concern about experiencing low relative income is strong, 
the effects described in this paper will be evident, less so when social comparisons are loose 
and relative income concerns are limited. 
Although the effects highlighted in the paper relate to production in village and 
plausibly to other small economies, they can apply to other small populations, such as a 
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community or a school class, where incentives are influenced by social comparisons. For 
example, in the case of a school class, the transfer of a poorly-performing student could 
induce the remaining students to study more diligently.  
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APPENDIX. BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON THE CONCEPT OF RELATIVE 
DEPRIVATION  
A.1 A brief history of relative deprivation in economics 
Considerable economic analysis has been inspired by the sociological-psychological concepts 
of relative deprivation (RD) and reference groups. Economists have come to consider these 
concepts as fitting tools for studying comparisons that affect an individual’s behavior, in 
particular, comparisons with related individuals whose incomes are higher than his own 
income (consult the large literature spanning from Duesenberry, 1949, to, for example, Clark 
et al., 2008). An individual has an unpleasant sense of being relatively deprived when he lacks 
a desired good and perceives that others in his reference group possess that good (Runciman, 
1966).7 Given the income distribution of the individual’s reference group, the individual’s RD 
is the sum of the deprivation caused by every income unit that he lacks (Yitzhaki, 1979; Hey 
and Lambert, 1980; Ebert and Moyes, 2000; Bossert and D’Ambrosio, 2006; Stark and Hyll, 
2011). 
The pioneering study in modern times that opened the flood-gates to research on RD 
and primary (reference) groups is the 1949 two-volume set of Stouffer et al. Studies in Social 
Psychology in World War II: The American Soldier. That work documented the distress 
caused not by a given low military rank and weak prospects of promotion (military police) but 
rather by the pace of promotion of others (air force). It also documented the lesser 
dissatisfaction of black soldiers stationed in the South who compared themselves with black 
civilians in the South than the dissatisfaction of their counterparts stationed in the North who 
compared themselves with black civilians in the North. Stouffer’s research was followed by a 
large social-psychological literature. Economics has caught up relatively late, and only 
                                                          
7 In Runciman’s (1966) theory of RD, an individual’s reference group is the group of individuals with whom the 
individual compares himself (consult Singer, 1981). 
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somewhat. This is rather surprising because eminent economists in the past understood well 
that people compare themselves to others around them, and that social comparisons are of 
paramount importance for individuals’ happiness, motivation, and actions. Even Adam Smith 
(1776) pointed to the social aspects of the necessities of life, and stressed the relative nature 
of poverty: “A linen shirt, for example, is, strictly speaking, not a necessary of life. The 
Greeks and Romans lived, I suppose, very comfortably, though they had no linen. But in the 
present times, through the greater part of Europe, a creditable day-laborer would be ashamed 
to appear in public without a linen shirt, the want of which would be supposed to denote that 
disgraceful degree of poverty […]” (p. 465). Marx’s (1849) observations that “Our wants and 
pleasures have their origin in the society; [… and] they are of a relative nature” (p. 33) 
emphasize the social nature of utility, and the impact of an individual’s relative position on 
his satisfaction. Inter alia, Marx wrote: “A house may be large or small; as long as the 
surrounding houses are equally small, it satisfies all social demands for a dwelling. But if a 
palace arises beside the little house, the house shrinks into a hut” (p. 33). Samuelson (1973), 
one of the founders of modern neoclassical economics, pointed out that an individual’s utility 
does not depend only on what he consumes in absolute terms: “Because man is a social 
animal, what he regards as ‘necessary comforts of life’ depends on what he sees others 
consuming” (p. 218). 
The relative income hypothesis, formulated by Duesenberry (1949), posits an 
asymmetry in the comparisons of income which affect the individual’s behavior: the 
individual looks upward when making comparisons. Veblen’s (1899) concept of pecuniary 
emulation explains why the behavior of an individual can be influenced by comparisons with 
the incomes of those who are richer. Because income determines the level of consumption, 
higher income levels may be the focus for emulation. Thus, an individual’s income aspirations 
(to obtain the income levels of other individuals whose incomes are higher than his own) are 
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shaped by the perceived consumption standards of the richer individuals. In that way, 
invidious comparisons affect behavior, that is, behavior which leads to “the achievement of a 
favourable comparison with other men [...]” (Veblen, 1899, p. 33).8  
A.2 The rationale and construction of a measure of relative deprivation  
Several recent insightful studies in social psychology (for example, Callan et al., 2011; Smith 
et al., 2012) document how sensing RD impacts negatively on personal wellbeing, but these 
studies do not provide a calibrating procedure; a sign is not a magnitude. For the purpose of 
constructing a measure, a natural starting point is the work of Runciman (1966), who, as 
already noted in the preceding section, argued that an individual has an unpleasant sense of 
being relatively deprived when he lacks a desired good and perceives that others with whom 
he naturally compares himself possess that good. Runciman (1966, p. 19) writes as follows: 
“The more people a man sees promoted when he is not promoted himself, the more people he 
may compare himself with in a situation where the comparison will make him feel deprived,” 
thus implying that the deprivation from not having, say, income y is an increasing function of 
the fraction of people in the individual’s reference group who have y. To aid intuition and for 
the sake of concreteness, we resort to income-based comparisons, namely an individual feels 
relatively deprived when others in his comparison group earn more than he does. An implicit 
assumption here is that the earnings of others are publicly known. Alternatively, we can think 
of consumption, which might be more publicly visible than income, although these two 
variables can reasonably be assumed to be strongly positively correlated.  
                                                          
8 The empirical findings support the relative income hypothesis. Duesenberry (1949) found that individuals’ 
savings rates depend on their positions in the income distribution, and that the incomes of the richer people affect 
the behavior of the poorer ones (but not vice versa). Schor (1998) showed that, keeping annual and permanent 
income constant, individuals whose incomes are lower than the incomes of others in their community save 
significantly less than those in their community who are relatively better off.  
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Let 
1( ,..., )my y y  be the vector of incomes in population N of size n with relative 
incidences ( )p y   1( ),..., ( )mp y p y , where m n  is the number of distinct income levels in 
y. The RD of an individual earning 
iy  is defined as the weighted sum of the excesses of 
incomes higher than 
iy  such that each excess is weighted by its relative incidence, namely  
                                                    ( ) ( )( )
k i
N i k k i
y y
RD y p y y y

  .                                                 (A1) 
We expand the vector y  to include incomes with their possible respective repetitions, 
that is, we include each 
iy  as many times as its incidence dictates, and we assume that the 
incomes are ordered, that is, 
1( ,..., )ny y y  such that 1 2 ... nyy y   . In this case, the 
relative incidence of each 
iy , ( )ip y , is 1/ n , and ( ) ( )( )
k i
N i k k i
y y
RD y p y y y

  , defined for 
1,..., 1i n  , becomes  
 
1
1
( ) .
n
N i k
k i
iRD y y y
n  
   
Looking at incomes in a large population, we can model the distribution of incomes as 
a random variable Y over the domain [0, )  with a cumulative distribution function F. We can 
then express the RD of an individual earning 
iy  as  
                                                   1 ( ) |N i i i iRD y F y E Y y Y y     .                                  (A2) 
To obtain this expression, starting from (A1), we have that 
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The formula in (A2) states that the RD of an individual whose income is 
iy  is equal to the 
product of two terms:  1 iF y , which is the fraction of those individuals in the population of 
n  individuals whose incomes are higher than 
iy , and ( | )i iE Y y Y y  , which is the mean 
excess income.  
The formula in (A2) is quite revealing because it casts RD in a richer light than the 
ordinal measure of rank or, for that matter, even the ordinal measure of status, which have 
been studied intensively in sociology and beyond. The formula informs us that when the 
income of individual A is, say, 10, and that of individual B is, say, 16, the RD of individual A 
is higher than when the income of individual B is 15, even though, in both cases, the rank of 
individual A in the income hierarchy is second. The formula also informs us that more RD is 
sensed by an individual whose income is 10 when the income of another is 14 (RD is 2) than 
when the income of each of four others is 11 (RD is 
4
5
), even though the excess income in 
both cases is 4. This property aligns nicely with intuition: it is more painful (more stress is 
experienced) when the income of half of the population in question is 40 percent higher, than 
when the income of 
4
5
 of the population is 10 percent higher. In addition, the formula in (A2) 
reveals that even though RD is sensed by looking to the right of the income distribution, it is 
impacted by events taking place on the left of the income distribution. For example, an exit 
from the population of a low-income individual increases the RD of higher-income 
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individuals (other than the richest) because the weight that the latter attach to the difference 
between the incomes of individuals “richer” than themselves and their own income rises.  
Similar reasoning can explain the demand for positional goods (Hirsch, 1976). The 
standard explanation is that this demand arises from the unique value of positional goods in 
elevating the social status of their owners (“These goods [are] sought after because they 
compare favorably with others in their class.” Frank, 1985, p. 7). The distaste for relative 
deprivation offers another explanation: by acquiring a positional good, an individual shields 
himself from being leapfrogged by others which, if that were to happen, would expose him to 
RD. Seen this way, a positional good is a form of insurance against experiencing RD. 
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